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Fitzgerald, Michael W. Reconstruction in Alabama: From Civil War to
Redemption in the Cotton South. LSU Press, $49.95 ISBN 9780807166062
The Rise and Fall of Reconstruction in Alabama
On the first page of Reconstruction in Alabama: From Civil War to
Redemption in the Cotton South, we learn that 1905 was the last time a scholarly
book was published on the Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama. Surely
this topic is in need of an update. And there is no better person to do it that
Michael Fitzgerald. For most of his academic career, he has thought deeply
about Reconstruction and explored many of its facets in Alabama, first with his
groundbreaking The Union League Movement in the Deep South, and then in his
innovative study on popular politics (Urban Emancipation) and also his
synthetic work on southern Reconstruction (Splendid Failure). Interspersed
among these major works, he has published more than a dozen articles and
essays on Reconstruction in Alabama. But the value of Reconstruction in
Alabama is much more than a mere revision of Walter Lynwood Fleming’s racist
interpretation from 1905. Here we have one of the leading historians of
Reconstruction weighing in on many of the most difficult and enduring questions
of the era.
Ever attentive to Reconstruction historiography, Fitzgerald has framed his
book not on the black experience, as Eric Foner and Steve Hahn did, but on
divisions among white Alabamians. Beginning with secession, he notes that most
of northern Alabama voted against secession while southern Alabama did the
opposite. These divisions over Unionism festered during the war years and blew
up into a bitter guerilla war in the north. After Confederate defeat, Unionists
hoped for protection from the federal government. Instead, Alabama’s white
voters embraced former Confederates, although not the most rabid, to guide the
state back into the Union. Seeking to postpone a swift return of state authority
and to ensure longer access to federal troops, Unionists took up the cause of
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freedmen’s rights and argued for a more sustained intervention in the state. This,
Fitzgerald contends, was the origin of the often troubled Reconstruction alliance
between black and white Unionists.
The struggle of these Unionists and rank-and-file Republicans is somewhat
obscured by the book’s state-level focus, the consequence of which is that state
leaders and state policies drive the narrative. At times, Fitzgerald interrupts this
traditional history of governors, elections, and laws. In his fifth chapter, “Black
Liberation,” he examines the struggle for black freedom and the reorganization
of the plantation system. The rise of tenant farming, he argues, provided a
measure of stability that plantation owners could live with and thus provided a
crucial space for black politics to sink roots and begin to grow. Planter tolerance
of free labor and a willingness to accept black political empowerment along with
northern white Unionism stifled the formation of an all-white, racist campaign to
drive black people into subservience. That would come later. But in the late
1860s and early 1870s, “freedpeople [had] real leverage” and pragmatically
deployed their power to better their lives (8).
Although military Reconstruction marks a decisive turning point in
Alabama’s history, important continuities existed between Democrat, military,
and Republican administrations that explain the persistence of both radical
changes as well as the violent opposition to Reconstruction. Beginning with
Democratic Governor Robert M. Patton, all the governors placed a high priority
on railroad promotion, often to the detriment of black people’s citizenship rights.
Republican Governor William Hugh Smith, for instance, did little to counter
Klan terrorism for fear of alienating conservative whites and imperiling his
efforts to build the Alabama & Chattanooga line. Black voters were never as
enamored with railroads as elites were, but they did appreciate the thousands of
new railroad construction jobs as well as capital investment in local
communities. But the laws crafted by political leaders favored the creditors and
did not provide sufficient restraint on using state credit to finance projects. In
particular, Gov. Smith ascribed millions of dollars of railroad bonds to the state,
an obligation that weighed down and doomed subsequent administrations.
Railroad men bribed and cajoled lawmakers to enact these favorable terms, but it
was not, contrary to the racist invectives of the Dunning school historians, black
voters or black lawmakers that spearheaded railroad corruption.
Despite the modest efforts of state officials in both Democrat and
Republican administrations to promote social stability and labor peace, the Klan
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rampaged through much of the state. Indeed, it was the very attention to
freedpeople’s improvement by the state that sparked a backlash by impoverished
white men. They rallied to the Ku Klux Klan not merely, Fitzgerald suggests,
because of biracial politics and Republican rule but because they had suffered
substantial economic losses as a result of emancipation. A close analysis of Klan
participants reveals that they suffered a tenfold loss of wealth owing to war and
the liberation of black people. The Klan suppressed enough black votes and
participated in enough electoral fraud in 1870 to ensure the election of a
Democratic governor, Robert Lindsay. But freedpeople found other ways to
maximize their leverage.
Republican delegates produced a progressive constitution in 1868 that
radically restructured state government by providing for a more equal justice
system, establishing free, public schools, and providing state credit for private
development projects. High cotton stabilized the plantation belt, which led to
more negotiations instead of coercion between planters and tenants, and planters
learned to tolerate black political power. Elite white acceptance of
Reconstruction gave black people a space to press for higher political offices and
new civil rights legislation. But what is most interesting about the growing
sophistication of black politics, Fitzgerald argues, was their flexibility and
dexterity in the face of white hostility. Indeed, what scholars have not fully
appreciated is “how widely freedpeople deterred violence” and “how normal life
appeared” in the black belt, at least before 1874 (9).
The relative progress and stability produced by Reconstruction began to
quickly unravel after the economic crash of 1873. While historians usually
emphasize the spike in urban employment and the turn of northern public
opinion against Republicans, Fitzgerald argues that the Panic had a direct impact
on Alabama agriculture. The depression caused cotton prices to plummet,
plunging plantations into chaos and prompting planters to align with the White
League and other reactionary forces. The collapse of the cotton economy brought
Alabama’s white Democratic factions together in a united racist campaign that
ultimately overthrew Reconstruction in the state. Efforts in Congress to pass a
new civil rights law further tainted Alabama Republicans in the eyes of most
white Alabamians. “Focusing on the [federal] civil rights bill,” explains
Fitzgerald, “allowed Democrats to channel all other white social grievances”
(309). The backlash from railroad debt also hurt Republican chances, as they
were identified with the state support of economic development. Although the
generous railroad policies had originated from former Whigs, the debt issue
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prompted most Democrats to embrace a Jacksonian perspective on state aid,
ruling out the use of state credit for future private development.
Democratic election victories in 1874 ushered in a Redemption era that
began to push black people out of formal politics and allowed landowners to
more easily control workers. These changes were enshrined in a new constitution
that repealed guaranteed educational funding and ended black jury service. After
1880, black officeholding and positive government faded away and were
replaced by white elites who then spread a fraudulent story of corrupt
carpetbaggers and freedmen to justify their rule.
Reconstruction in Alabama is not a major departure from existing
scholarship. It is more traditional in its conceptualization of Reconstruction than
much of the recent work, yet the book demonstrates a masterful synthesis of the
era. Students of the Civil War Era will appreciate its admirable attention to detail
and its judicious conclusions. It’s a book not to be missed.
Justin Behrend is an Associate Professor and chair of the History
Department at the State University of New York at Geneseo. He is the author of
Reconstructing Democracy: Grassroots Black Politics in the Deep South after the
Civil War (University of Georgia Press, 2015). He can be reached at
behrend@geneseo.edu.
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